





Emotional experiences play a central role in relationships with others. The aim of this paper is 
to study the manifestation, and phenomenological significance of emotions in depression, as 
they occur in the domain of interpersonal relationships, and the way they are influenced by 
culture. Adopting a phenomenological perspective, and using Sartre’s accounts of interpersonal 
relationships and the significance of emotions, I offer an account of emotional experiences in 
depression among Iranian patients. As compared to those in the UK, Iranians complain about a 
range of different emotional experiences in depression. These include the replacement of guilt 
with aggression, and the desire to isolate oneself from others, as opposed to feeling lonely, as 
is seen in the UK. These differences, as I show, can be accounted for through a) 
phenomenological considerations of the kind of experiences we as human beings go through, 
and b) cultural norms and frames of thought which play a role in the significance of such 
experiences and their interpretations.  
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Cross-cultural variation in mental disorders, including depression, have been subject of various 
studies, mainly in medical anthropology and cross-cultural psychiatry. Seminal works by 
Arthur Kleinman on depression in China (e.g. Kleinman, 1982) are noteworthy in this context, 
as is the collection of studies presented in Culture and Depression (Kleinman & Good, 1985). 
Some works have also examined cultural variations in pre-morbid personality associated with 
depression (Ogawa, et al., 1992). Although there have been some studies on depression and 
dysphoric affect in Iran (e.g. Good, 1976, Good, et al., 1985, Behrouzan, 2016), the objectives 
of these differ from the study at hand. This paper, situated within this broader discussion, aims 
to offer a phenomenological account of some cross-cultural variations in experiences of 
depression. Here, individuals and their experiences are viewed as situated within a sociocultural 
context, and variations in experiences are analysed and accounted for given this cultural 
embeddedness.  
Differences in phenomenology of depression between the UK and Iran were 
investigated via the use of a questionnaire. In Experiences of Depression (2015) Ratcliffe 
presents the findings of a study using a questionnaire completed by patients with depression in 
the UK. The same questionnaire (translated into Farsi) was employed to investigate the 
experiences of people with depression in Iran (See Appendix). Responses to a pilot study 
indicated that there were likely to be important differences in the ways UK and Iranian patients 
experienced interpersonal relationships, and some additional questions were added to the 
questionnaire to further probe the Iranian experience of interpersonal relationships in 
depression. It was initially planned to make the questionnaire available to Iranian patients online 
(as had been done in the UK study). However, it proved difficult to find a suitable online 
platform in Iran. To increase the number of responses, the questionnaire was also distributed in 
a University Clinic in Shiraz. A total of 43 responses were recorded (10 males and 33 females), 
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13 of which were completed online, and the remaining 30 were completed by patients at the 
clinic. Five of the respondents had received diagnoses of other mental disorders as well as 
depression (two bipolar and three obsessive disorders). All numbered quotes included in this 
paper are taken from responses to this questionnaire. 
Striking cross-cultural differences in experiences between Iran and the UK, relate to the 
manifestation of the breaking of the interpersonal bond in depression. The existential change in 
depression, influencing the way one views other people and one’s relationship with them, plays 
a significant role in shaping the overall experience of depression. In this paper, I look at 
interpersonal experiences in depression as seen in Iran, and show how some elements of these 
experiences are different from those seen in the UK, due to cultural differences.  
The most salient differences found in this context are, firstly, that whilst those in the 
UK complain of feeling lonely, Iranians talk about wanting to isolate themselves and ‘escape’ 
from other people. And secondly, while UK patients feel guilty, Iranian patients more 
commonly feel aggressive. I will suggest that these differences can be accounted for through 
cultural variations. In particular, cultural elements at play here are 1) the misconceptions of 
depression in Iran and the hostile attitudes arising from it, and 2) the collectivist nature of 
Iranian society and cultural norms of  relations with others, which influence the emotional 
experiences between individuals. 
With these cultural elements in mind, I will use Sartre’s account of interpersonal 
relationships, and emotions, as the framework for understanding the dynamics of interpersonal 
conflict which, I argue, underlies the emotional experiences in depression. Sartre gives an 
account of the universal nature of our being and consciousness and as such, when it comes to 
culturally specific behaviours and patterns of thought and interpretation, his account will only 
provide guidance for framing the analysis, rather than providing a theory to be directly applied 
to the case at hand. I first set out the Sartrean theoretical background before turning to the 
 4 
emotional experiences among Iranian patients with depression, in the domain of personal 
relationships.  
Relating to others as persons 
Sartre (2003) maintains that at the heart of difficulties in interpersonal relations, is an inherent 
interpersonal conflict, arising from the way we see ourselves in relation to the Other.  This 
conflict, he argues, arises from our way of being, and relating to others.  
In Being and Nothingness (2003), Sartre observes that the fundamental element in our 
human consciousness is intentionality – the fact that our consciousness is first and foremost 
directed outwards and is consciousness of something, out there in the world. In our awareness 
of ourselves and the world, therefore, we are conscious subjects aware of other things that 
comprise our sense of the world in which we dwell, and these other things are always taken as 
objects of our consciousness, i.e. as things that we are consciously aware of.  
However, this conception of oneself as inherently a subject, is fundamentally 
transformed in one’s encounter with the Other. Through the recognition of the Other as a 
conscious being such as myself, i.e. as a person, I realise the possibility that as a subject, the 
Other can take me as the object of his consciousness. This recognition of the Other as a person 
like myself, Sartre claims, comes from certain emotions that I can only have in the presence of 
the Other, such as shame and guilt. Sartre argues that the very existence of these emotions, the 
very possibility of experiencing them, makes evident the essence of the Other as a person for 
whose consciousness I can be an object. In such a situation, I realise that the Other can see me, 
and this being seen by the Other, reveals me to myself anew. This is since I now see myself 
through the eyes of the Other, as I appear to the Other, as an object, and through the judgements 
that the Other can pass on me. “By the mere appearance of the Other, I am put in the position 
of passing judgement on myself as an object, for it is as an object that I appear to the Other” 
(Sartre, 2003, p. 246). 
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The presence of others opens up new possibilities for me. Possibilities which rely on the 
recognition of others as persons, and which include those of meaning-making, the experiencing 
of certain emotions, and understanding of oneself and the world where one dwells. In Sartre’s 
terminology, in the presence of the Other, my Being for myself – being-for-itself – is 
transformed into the mode of being of things – being-in-itself –, in the eyes of the Other. This 
transformation is crucial for me to realise my being fully, since it makes possible a more 
complete knowledge of myself, which exist only in the presence of the Other. It is because of 
this crucial transformation and the new possibilities brought about by it, that Sartre argues that 
our being as humans is essentially social; it is through our relationships with others that our 
being is made complete: “I need the Other in order to realize fully all the structures of my being” 
(Ibid.). And it is thus that our being, as a For-itself, is inherently, and essentially, a being-for-
others.  
This transformation, however, also gives rise to conflict. This arises due to the 
unfamiliar nature of myself in the face of the Other: the Other forces me to see myself in a new 
way, one which bears no resemblance to the image I hold of myself, i.e. as a subject with certain 
characteristics. This objectification of my being by the Other is naturally met with fierce 
resistance and leads to an unresolvable conflict in which both I and the Other attempt to 
establish our subject-ness by escaping the inevitable objectification of the other. This struggle 
is seen in all forms of relationships, as Sartre argues, from loving to hateful to indifferent, at 
the heart of all kinds of relationships remains an unresolvable and necessary conflict.  This is 
since in all instances, different in appearance as they might be, the struggle to save one’s 
subjectivity from the look of the Other will be present.  
Everything which may be said of me in relations with the Other applies to him as 
well. While I attempt to free myself from the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to 
free himself from mine, while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave 
 6 
me. We are by no means dealing with unilateral relations with an object-in-itself, but 
with reciprocal and moving relations. (Sartre, 2003, p. 386)  
This conflict is important, since it enables one to see an image of oneself that would otherwise 
remain concealed. Additionally, this conflict generates certain emotions, experience of which 
would be impossible without the presence of the Other. To understand this importance and the 
way these emotions arise, it is important to have an account of emotions themselves.  
A Phenomenological Theory of Emotions 
In Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions, Sartre offers an outline of a phenomenological account 
of emotions, whereby emotions are significative of the human reality, of the whole of one’s 
consciousness; arguing that emotion is “an organized form of human existence” (Sartre, 1962, 
p. 28).  
Emotions, like other acts of consciousness, are intentional and are directed towards the 
world. In experiencing fear, one is afraid of something out there in the world, and in 
experiencing love, the emotion is directed to a certain object or person out there in the world. 
Emotional consciousness, therefore, is consciousness of the world, and because of the relational 
nature of emotions, the subject and object of an emotion are “united in an indissoluble 
synthesis” (Ibid., p. 57). Emotions, Sartre argues, form a specific manner of apprehending the 
world in which we dwell. For example, take the sense of irritation at one’s inability to solve a 
problem. Whilst solving the problem, one is aware of different things out there in the world that 
contribute to the problem, or to the attempt at solving the problem. The irritation itself is a way 
the world appears to one. The emotional experience of irritation is both a reaction to the world, 
and a way of understanding and apprehending the world. It can be seen, therefore, that our 
emotions are entangled with the world and the way it appears to us. Thus, emotions are always 
significative of our human reality: the way we find meaning in the world where we dwell, and 
the way in which we see the world itself.   
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Emotions, Sartre argues, are transformative of the world we live in, since in their 
presence, we see the world in a new way and therefore are presented with different possibilities 
offered by this new world. This transformative nature of emotions, rooted in imaginative 
consciousness (Sartre, 2004), is what differentiates emotional ways of apprehending the world 
from other ways of doing so. We perceive our environment “as a complex of instruments, a 
medium in which, provided we know certain rules or techniques, we can manipulate people and 
things so as to achieve certain ends” (Fell, 1965, p. 15). This perception of the world is made 
possible due to our intuitions about the nature of the world as orderly, as “ruled by deterministic 
processes” (Sartre, 1962, p. 63). It is only based on our presumptions that the world is regular, 
that we assume certain actions would guarantee certain ends. In emotions, however, through 
the power of imagination, this perception is transformed: 
When the paths before us become too difficult, or when we cannot see our way, we 
can no longer put up with such an exacting and difficult world. All ways are barred 
and nevertheless we must act. So when we try to change the world; that is, to live as 
though the relations between things and their potentialities were not governed by 
deterministic processes but by magic. (Sartre, 1962, p. 63) 
Sartre provides a simple example to clarify how emotional consciousness and behaviours 
transform our understanding of the world and therefore our space of possibilities. Take the 
situation in which I reach to pluck a bunch of grapes, but am unable to do so as they are beyond 
my reach. In response, “I shrug my shoulders, muttering: ‘they are too green’” (Ibid., p. 65). 
Sartre argues that conferring the quality of being ‘too green’ on the grapes, acts as a substitute 
for the act which I intended or desired, but were unable to complete. In other words, the 
attractive quality by which they were presented to me – as ‘ready for gathering’ as Sartre puts 
it –, becomes intolerable when the possibility presented to me cannot be actualised. The tension 
created through this inability to actualise a possibility is resolved when I confer a new quality 
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onto the grapes; i.e. their being ‘too green’. Now of course, one cannot confer this new quality 
chemically, but rather through “putting on the behaviour of disrelish” (Ibid., p. 66). It is in such 
a way that I confer the quality onto the grapes imaginatively, and it is thus that emotions come 
about: “In this case the comedy is only half sincere. But let the situation be more critical; let the 
incantatory behaviour be maintained in all seriousness: and there you have emotion” (Ibid.). 
Emotions, therefore, are like other acts of consciousness, purposive: they are a way of 
acting, with imagination underlying the ‘magical’ transformative power of emotions. The 
transformation of one’s perception of the world, from a deterministic and pragmatic one, into a 
magical, or imaginative one, enables one to see new possibilities, new ways for achieving a 
goal, or new ways of apprehending the world and changes in one’s space of possibilities. This 
is since, in imaginative transformation, the perceived object is transformed so as to conform to 
our desires towards the object. It is in this sense that our emotions remake the object in 
imagination, and it is through this remaking that new possibilities arise: the deterministic nature 
of the environment no longer presents itself as a limiting condition, since the new quality 
projected onto the world (or a certain object in the world), presents to one’s consciousness a 
new way of apprehending the world. This new apprehension, then, presents new potentialities, 
new possibilities, and new ways to act upon one’s desires, by directing one’s emotional 
consciousness to the world. Therefore, in having an emotion directed to the world, or something 
within it, we are acting upon the world, by projecting our desires onto it, and in so doing, we 
find a new way of apprehending the world. Given this relational nature, Sartre’s theory offers 
a way of understanding emotions, as significative of our being-in-the-world: “Emotion is a sign 
of the conscious interpretation man puts on his experience” (Fell, 1965, p. 51).  
Empathy and Unhomelikeness 
So far the concern has been with the nature of emotions and emotional consciousness. 
Understanding emotional experiences in depression among Iranians requires brief discussion 
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of another notion, namely moods. In this discussion, I follow Heidegger’s account of moods; 
as an attunement to the world, colouring the way everything appears to one. Unlike emotions, 
moods are not directed towards a specific object, are not thought of as ways of acting upon the 
world, and rather “form of their own accord, as something we cannot forcibly bring about, but 
into which we slip unawares” (Heidegger, 1995, p. 59). Moods disclose the world we inhabit, 
defining our being ‘there’ in the world, and thus form the backdrop of our experiences of being-
in-the-world, including emotional experiences.1  
Using this notion of moods, Svenaeus (2000a, 2000b, 2011) develops his account of 
unhomelikeness, as the defining mood in illness, characterised by a sense of unfamiliarity in 
the world and one’s body. Despite the all-encompassing nature of this mood in illness, its 
manifestations can be different in different illnesses, and in particular domains of illness 
experience (compare sense of unhomelikeness due to impared physical ability, to one due to 
altered perception of the world in affective disorders). In the case of the experiences of 
depression in Iranian patients, part of this mood of unhomelikeness is brought about through 
misunderstandings and misconceptions of depression. These arise in part from folk beliefs and 
theories about the nature of illness more generally, causing a sense of unfamiliarity in the 
(social) world the patient inhabits. In Iranian folk understanding, as I argue at length elsewhere 
(Mirdamadi, forthcoming), illness is construed as essentially a physical phenomenon, with at 
least some physical symptoms and manifestations. Thus, the understanding of depression as 
primarily a non-physical illness, without familiar observable physical symptoms such as tissue 
damage, is lacking. Such misconceptions of depression, often lead to judgements and attitudes 
that can be stigmatising, and perceived as lacking in empathy, thus creating a sense of 
                                                
1 There are similarities between moods defined as such, and existential feelings (e.g. Ratcliffe 
2008, 2015), yet a full comparative account of the two notions is beyond the scope of this 
paper. For consistency and precision, I follow Svenaeues in calling unhomelikeness a mood, 
acknowledging the parallels with existential feelings.  
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unfamiliarity in the world for depressed individuals.  A mood of unhomelikeness thus defined, 
and the perception of a lack of empathy on the part of others, forms the background of emotional 
experiences in depression among Iranians.  
In giving an account of empathy, Ratcliffe argues that underlying the ability to 
empathise, is having “a kind of ‘openness’ to experiential differences” (Ratcliffe, 2015, p.238). 
It is not the case that in order to empathise, one would necessarily have to experience what 
another person is experiencing, i.e. moving from the second-person to the first-person to access 
a certain experience, giving rise to a “phenomenological isomorphism between the two parties” 
(Ibid. p.239), as is suggested in various theories of empathy.2 Rather, what is important is to 
establish a connection through understanding, whilst acknowledging the phenomenological 
differences between experiences. This ‘openness to difference’ in experiences, would be 
manifested in one’s manners in relation to the person having the experience, in the form of 
curiosity to understand, for example in asking certain questions (or not asking others), being 
attentive to the other’s needs, etc. Although it is noted that acknowledgment of the 
phenomenological differences in experience requires some grasp of the other person’s 
experiences, Ratcliffe maintains that “this can remain vague, ambiguous, indeterminate, 
without amounting to a failure of empathy” (Ratcliffe, 2015, p. 239).  
As such, the central element of empathy is an openness to understanding. The depressed 
patient who seeks to be empathised with, is seeking others, as a society but also as particular 
Others, to understand, or be willing to understand, her experiences in depression. Faced with 
judgements and attitudes arising from misconceptions of her illness, dominant in the Iranian 
society, the depressed patient feels that she is not being empathised with.  
                                                
2 Most prominent example of such theories is empathy as simulation, e.g. Stueber, 2006; 
Goldman, 2006, and similarly mirror or reconstructive empathy, seen in e.g. Goldman, 2011; 
De Vignemont, 2010 
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#14 – I felt like they didn’t understand me/empathize with me. 
#6 – When I’m depressed I feel like I don’t have an emotional connection with 
anyone. Nobody can be helpful with their presence. 
#2 – I feel like they do not have the capability (tavānāyi) to understand at all. 
And it is this sense, which creates and/or exacerbates the mood of unhomelikeness in the world; 
a sense of not being at home with the world and people within it.  
Furthermore, on this account, empathy is construed as an attitude taken towards one. 
Feeling empathised with, therefore, would mean the recognition of this attitude in the Other. 
This recognition requires an ability to ‘connect’ with other people, and it is this ability which, 
because of the existential change and mood of unhomelikeness, involved and dominant in 
depression, is impaired: the very possibility of attaining and maintaining this interpersonal 
connection is lost in depression. The mood of unhomelikeness, already dominant due to the 
social misunderstanding of depression, further dominates the interpersonal relations. This is 
such that a depressed person is unable to identify in others the empathetic attitudes directed 
towards her, even in cases where such attitudes do indeed exist. This inability further gives rise 
to, and strengthens the central feeling of not being empathised with, or not being understood, 
which creates the backdrop of emotional difficulties in interpersonal relationships.  
That this mood of unhomelikeness, arising from the socio-cultural sphere, adversely 
affects the interpersonal domain, is not surprising, since our encounters with others in the social 
setting influence our experiences, expectations, and attitudes in the interpersonal sphere. 
Inevitably, the general understanding of depression, and the attitude taken towards it in the 
social domain, are not distinct from those found in the interpersonal sphere, rather they 
influence one another, since the norms and attitudes held by the society represent the attitudes 
of individuals to a certain extent, and the individuals within the society have the power to 
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change the norms of the society. For the depressed person, the lack of understanding in the 
social domain creates the expectation of receiving the same behaviour in the interpersonal 
domain. This loop then carries within it the sense of unhomelikeness as the dominant mood 
colouring the experiences of interpersonal relationships.  
Iranian Patients’ Emotional Experiences in Depression 
The interpersonal experiences of depression among Iranians, relies heavily on emotional 
experiences. In addition to feelings of lack of empathy and interpersonal connection, Iranians 
often talk about having negative emotions towards others, or receiving them from others. These 
emotional experiences, in addition to being important in themselves, give rise to specific 
experiences and behaviours, an account of which would be incomplete without considering the 
role of the underlying emotions. Sartre’s account is especially helpful in analysing the totality 
of such emotions, experiences, and behaviours. First he claims that emotions are a way of acting 
upon the world, transforming the world by projecting one’s conscious interpretation of one’s 
experiences onto the world. In this sense, then, emotions and experiences form a meaning-
making loop: through our emotions we apprehend our experiences and the world, while our 
being-in-the-world and our experiences of it shape our emotions. Second, Sartre emphasises 
the relation between emotional experiences and relations with others; since our being-for and –
with others makes possible certain emotional experiences which give new meaning to our 
structure of being in the world generally.  
I would argue that lack of empathy, as perceived by depressed patients, is the underlying 
foundation of other emotional experiences. As seen in Sartre’s account of emotions, perception 
and imagination present the mechanism by which one comes to have a certain emotion. In the 
case of depression, the perceiving act is one of lack of empathy on the part of others. In reaction 
to this perception, one’s imagination and apprehension of this perception, projected upon the 
world in emotions, is governed by unhomelikeness as the dominant mood in depression, 
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defining the perceived space of possibilities and one’s view of others and the world. It is in this 
dynamic that one fails to connect with other people: “a kind of interpersonal connection that 
many of us take for granted seems impossible, absent from the world” (Ratcliffe, 2015, p.218). 
In this absence, what is highlighted instead, is the constant and ever-present conflict between 
one and others, which, as will become clearer, has a defining role in the emotional experiences 
in depression among Iranian patients. As such, this dynamic offers an understanding of how the 
interpersonal bond breaks down in depression; rather than considered in isolation, this 
breakdown finds meaning when considered in its entirety with different connected elements, 
emotional, behavioural, and cognitive alike. Throughout the following account, it should be 
borne in mind that the attunement of unhomelikeness dominates the way one thinks and 
apprehends one’s perceptions of others. 
#6 – I see what they do and their behaviours in a pessimistic/negative way. The 
routine (roozmarreh) behaviour of, for example, my parents become frustrating 
(asabi) to me. 
The perceived lack of empathy from others, and the mood of unhomelikeness that results from 
it, lead patients to view everything the Other does in a negative way, eliciting negative reactions 
in the form of attitudes and judgements. Against this attunement, the possibility of positive 
apprehension is lost, giving rise to the emotions under question.  
Negative emotions 
Compared to the UK, problems caused by misconceptions of depression are more prevalent in 
Iran. This is reflected in the questionnaire responses; patients comment on the lack of 
understanding of others and the burden they feel to legitimise their depression as a ‘real’ illness, 
both in the social and interpersonal domains. In the social domain, such misconceptions can 
lead to stigmatising attitudes towards depression and those suffering from it. In the interpersonal 
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domain, patients often complain of other people’s inability to understand their illness 
experiences, which in turn demands explanations that they are not always equipped to give. 
#1 – I’m not in the mood for having contact [with others] … everyone wants to know 
why I’m not the happy and smiling person I used to be and this makes me more 
isolated. 
#2 – The most important thing I can think of [is] the explanation as to why I sleep so 
much, why I cannot work, why I don’t take part in family activities and why I have 
become so powerless (nā-tavān) without a physical problem.  
#33 – [others annoyed me] by saying ‘you don’t feel well, why are you like this, you 
look unwell, the way you speak is different’. 
What is noteworthy here is the fact that these expectations arise from the social 
misunderstandings and misconceptions of depression itself. It is not the symptoms themselves, 
such as lack of energy and fatigue, that are questioned, but rather the presence of these 
symptoms in the absence of a physical illness. The patients are asked to legitimise their illness 
in a way to conform to the pre-existing assumptions and conceptualisations of what constitutes 
an illness.  
However, there is an undeniable difference between such judgments and expectations 
in the interpersonal domain, compared to the social sphere. In the interpersonal domain such 
judgments become personal. Here, the lack of understanding and empathy, is not interpreted as 
having to do with depression itself, or one’s experiences. Rather, patients feel that they 
themselves are not being understood, and other people do not have the capacity to understand 
them, as a person.  
#16 – I feel like others also are not in the mood [to deal with] me and … I feel like 
they don’t understand me. 
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#14 – I felt like they didn’t understand me. 
This personal nature of the perceived judgment, can be interpreted phenomenologically as the 
feeling of the Others passing judgements as to the kind of person that I am.  
The perception that those close to one lack the capability to understand one, against the 
backdrop of the attunement of depression, forms the basis of one’s relationships with others in 
depression. In this sense, then, one sees others as adopting a hostile view towards one. This 
perception of hostility, as an instance of the breakdown of the interpersonal bond, is seen both 
in the case of Iranian patients and those in the UK. “All that others are perceived to offer is a 
distinctively personal form of threat, which might be experienced more specifically as derision, 
dismissal, ridicule, condemnation, aggression, or shame” (Ratcliffe, 2015, p.220). These 
various manifestations of this perceived hostility are present among the Iranian patients as well, 
and they persist even in others’ absence.  
#14 – My sister didn’t apprehend that I had depression, she felt my aim was to get 
attention from the family. 
#25 – Others get upset and say that I’m trying to be classy. 
#17 – I feel like others … also talk behind my back and speak (badly) about me. 
#24 – My family hates me. 
#30 – [Others’] encounter has had a large impact – their behaviour [with me and my 
depression] has been really bad.  
What is clear here, is the perception of a wide range of negative attitudes, judgements and 
emotions directed to one in depression. This perception brings to the foreground the conflict 
between one and Other, formed here, due to the lack of understanding on the part of others. 
Although these may be merely perceived, coloured by the dominant mood of depression, this 
perception is a necessary step for the creation of an emotional response, as seen in Sartre’s 
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account. The perception of the world being a certain way, with one’s possibilities limited 
accordingly, motivates an emotional response, which take the form of negative emotions 
towards others. These negative emotions can be accounted for through two separate but linked 
considerations. The first is the already mentioned theory of emotions: following the perception 
of negative attitudes and judgements directed towards one, and in the background of the sense 
of unhomelikeness which dominates one’s thoughts and outlook to the world, certain negative 
emotions arise towards others. Secondly, in the context of conflict between one and the Other, 
through the perception of the Other passing judgements on one, seeing one according to these 
judgements and in a way unfamiliar to the individual, one feels objectified by the Other. As 
seen earlier, when faced with such feelings, one inevitably moves to re-establish one’s 
subjectivity by taking the Other as the object of one’s consciousness and one way of doing this 
is through one’s emotional consciousness towards the Other.  
#21 – I dislike everyone and nothing seems good to me. I feel hatred towards my 
children and family and want to escape from them. 
#7 – Sometimes in depression periods I would really really hate my father. 
#31 – I dislike all others. 
#28 – My brain didn’t believe what anyone was saying, like a person who hears 
something from one ear and it goes out from the other ear [Persian expression]. 
It is important to recall here the importance of such emotions, as instances of action taken by 
individuals in depression, but also as representative of their experiences and interpretation of 
their perception of the world around them. The feeling of hatred towards others, as well as being 
a reaction to the perceived negative attitudes and emotions towards the individual, are 
representative of the way one interprets one’s position among others in the world. Therefore, 
these emotions are also informative of the way one sees the world more generally. The feeling 
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of being stuck and the general sense of dissatisfaction with life are echoed in the emotions 
towards others. Sartre acknowledges this interconnectivity of one’s emotional consciousness, 
and sees it as an important pillar of emotional experiences as significative of one’s being more 
generally. “The impossibility of finding a solution to the problem is apprehended objectively, 
as a quality of the world. This serves to motivate the new unreflective consciousness which 
now grasps the world differently, under a new aspect, and imposes new behaviour – through 
which that aspect is grasped …” (Sartre, 1962, pp. 64-65).  
Aggression and Guilt 
One striking difference between the manifestations of depression in Iran, as compared to the 
UK, is the absence of feelings of guilt, and the presence of aggressive behaviour towards others.  
Feelings of guilt and shame are associated with being negatively evaluated, by oneself 
or the Other respectively, for failing to meet certain norms and standards of what is considered 
right or appropriate. Therefore, such feelings are regarded as ‘moral’ emotions (Wong and Tsai, 
2007). Additionally, shame and guilt are instances of ‘self-conscious’ emotions, “because they 
require a concept of the self, or an ability to see the self as an object of evaluation” (Ibid. p. 
210). I suggest that the Iranian conception of the self plays a central role in accounting for the 
absence of guilt among Iranian patients and its replacement with aggressive behaviour.  
A crucial difference between Iran and the UK, is the place and value of interpersonal 
relationships. As a collectivist society (Hofstede, 2001; House, et al., 2004), Iranian culture 
places heavy emphasis on shaping and maintaining social relationships, where the aims and 
goals of the individual are thought to have lower priority than that of the collective group. This 
contrasts with the individualistic nature of the UK society, in which the aims of the individual 
take precedence over the goals of the group. One important consequence of this structural 
difference, is that the concept of self is construed differently. “Individualistic societies are best 
characterized by their conception of an independent self that is bounded, unique, and generally 
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autonomous … social behaviour is generally judged to be driven from within and attributed to 
an individual’s internal attributes” (Goetz and Keltner, 2007, p. 158). By contrast, in (mostly) 
non-Western, collectivist cultures, “an interdependent self is seen as part of an encompassing 
social relationship, recognizing that one’s ‘self’ is determined by one’s relationship with others 
and the group” (ibid.). Individuals in collectivist societies, further, tend to attribute the causes 
of events in their lives, especially negative ones, to external sources, events, or people (Triandis, 
2001; Carpenter, 2000). In other words, in explaining events in their lives, individuals from 
collectivist societies are more likely to see external factors, including other people, as 
responsible rather than themselves. Unlike the UK patients, who either see their own 
shortcomings as the cause of their depression, or are unable to identify a cause at all, Iranians 
often attribute the cause of their depression to a source independent of themselves. 
#27 – The unsuccessful marriage that I had and the hard responsibility of a life with 
children [caused my depression]. 
#20 – Death of the dear ones has caused my depression, the pitying and humiliation 
because of this sadness has caused it. That I used to go to the cemetery and cry, and 
that others humiliated me for this caused my depression.  
#25 – I had a friend who betrayed me and I loved them so much I couldn’t believe it 
and I wanted to kill them but I visited the doctor and I was immediately hospitalised. 
When Iranians attribute the cause of their depression to another person, against the backdrop of 
the mood of unhomelikeness and negative emotions and hostility between the depressed 
individual and Others, then aggressive feelings can be expected.  
Iranian and UK cultures also differ in the extent to which others can be expected to help 
a suffering individual. Iranians often do favours for one another, friends and strangers alike, 
without being asked to do so, for example putting up banners and streetlights to welcome a 
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neighbour from a long journey, or congratulating them on an achievement. The expectation that 
others will always be there for one in need, to care for one, is central in the normal day-to-day 
relations with others. However, the lack of empathy perceived by individuals in depression, can 
be thought of as an instance of this expectation not being met. Consequently, Iranian depressed 
patients feel a sense of abandonment by others, as well as disappointment that their expectations 
are not met. This is seen in patients’ complaints of others’ reactions to their depression 
experiences, and form the basis of holding others – at least in part – responsible for the pain 
they go through. Such feelings are in direct contrast to the feelings of patients in the UK: whilst 
those in the UK talk about feeling as if they have become a burden on Others, Iranian patients 
talk about others being bored and tired of their depression. In other words, for those in the UK, 
feelings of resentment and responsibility are turned inwards towards oneself, in Iran such 
feelings are turned outwards towards others.  
#26 – I felt that others were also tired of my depression. 
#16 – Others get bored with my depression and always annoy/bother me. 
Such way of reasoning, as a point of difference between patients in Iran and the UK, can in part 
explain the absence of guilt and presence of aggression among Iranian patients. Criticism and 
dissatisfaction directed towards oneself is more likely to translate into feeling guilt and 
wrongdoing. This is while, as seen in the Iranian case, criticism directed outwards to others, 
and their failure to be or behave in a certain way as desired by the patient, motivates an outward 
reaction in the form of aggressive behaviour.  
The interpersonal conflict at the foreground of consciousness in depression also plays a 
role in generating aggression. As seen earlier, part of what the interpersonal experience in 
depression involves, is a sense of hostility one feels directed towards oneself by others. This 
hostility is seen in the perception of negative emotions directed towards one, in turn eliciting 
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emotional responses. In such cases, where one feels that her sense of self is being threatened by 
the negative valuations and judgments, and especially where one does not see oneself 
responsible and thus resistant to guilt, aggression and aggressive behaviours are more likely to 
come about (e.g. Stuewig and Tangney, 2007). Feeling misunderstood, receiving judgments 
which bring into question the ‘reality’ of one’s illness and one’s motivations for ‘appearing ill’, 
can be perceived as an attack on one’s self, which warrants reactions of anger and aggression. 
As seen in Sartre’s characterisation, in relations with the Other one is constantly made to 
reassert oneself as a subject, in response to feeling threatened by the Other’s objectification of 
oneself. Against the backdrop of the breaking of the interpersonal bond, one where lack of 
understanding, negativity and hostility define one’s encounter with the Other, aggressive 
behaviour could be thought of as a strong attempt to reassert oneself in response to the perceived 
attacks of the Other.  
#20 – I become aggressive, I don’t answer the phone and am not in the mood for 
[being with] others, or I tell them not to call me or to stay away from me. 
#6 – I get aggressive. I don’t have the tolerance for the simplest disagreements or 
arguments. 
#7 – I’m either completely defeated (maghloob), or angry and aggressive, or quiet 
(sāket) and stagnant/tranquil/static. 
#25 – I would get angry really quickly and easily … I can’t be kind to my children, I 
can’t go to my shop and I always want to commit suicide or kill the one who has 
betrayed me. 
Due to the variety and interconnectivity of the different elements at play here, it is difficult to 
single-out one element as the cause of the presence of aggressive behaviour in Iran and its 
absence in the UK. However, what the analysis here shows, is that a multiplicity of cultural 
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norms and expectations, the severity of problems in the interpersonal and social domains in 
depression, and the range of emotions in reaction to these problems together give a convincing 
picture of the cross-cultural difference. I would also argue that the totality of these problems 
can be seen in the frame of the interpersonal conflict, exacerbated in depression, from which 
the individual attempts to escape, when faced with its severity and the impossibility of finding 
a resolution. This conflict is the ‘problem’, as Sartre argues, that motivates one’s imagination 
to conceive of different emotional and behavioural reactions. And as one perceives the conflict 
as more difficult to resolve, so the reactions grow in intensity to resolve it. In the case of Iran, 
however, due to the strong entanglement between individuals, as well as between the individual 
and the social groups and society, where the lines between private and public life, between one 
and the Other, are blurred, one is neither able to resolve this conflict, since against the 
depressive mood such a possibility is not even conceived, nor to escape from it. And it is in this 
dynamic, that the most prevalent and talked about difference between patients in the two 
cultures is seen, namely, voluntary isolation and escape from others.  
Isolation 
In addition to aggressive behaviours, another notable difference in interpersonal emotions in 
depression between Iran and the UK, is Iranians’ solitary tendencies. Ratcliffe shows that those 
suffering from depression in the UK often talk about a sense of solitude and loneliness, one that 
goes hand in hand with a sense of estrangement from the world more generally. On Ratcliffe’s 
account, this feeling of loneliness is closely tied with that of lack of empathy and not being 
understood: “there is a feeling that [others] do not understand, which could equally be described 
as a feeling that they are unable to ‘relate to’ or ‘connect with’ the depressed person” (Ratcliffe, 
2015, p.202). As such, lack of understanding is construed as evidence of the breakdown of the 
interpersonal bond, which leads to the depressed person feeling estranged from others, 
overcome by a sense of loneliness and solitude. 
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In the case of Iran, however, there is no talk of feeling lonely. Rather, Iranian patients 
talk about wanting to escape from others and to be alone. Two important notes should be made 
with regards to this difference. Firstly, that the state of isolation from others is not only not 
complained about, but represents a desired state of being. Secondly, despite the feeling of lack 
of understanding present in both contexts, this feeling does not amount to a sense of 
estrangement from others, in the form of willing, but being unable to establish an interpersonal 
connection with others, as it does in the UK. Rather, it seems that the very willingness to do so 
is lost. I would argue that both these elements can be accounted for through the interpersonal 
conflict which dominates one’s relationships with others in depression, and the differences in 
terms of the kind of society and the kind of prevalent norms in which the individuals are thrown.  
#15 – I was always in a corner not talking to anyone [the phrase is ‘being in myself’], 
I was hermitic (goosheh-gir), avoided gatherings, was not in the mood to be around 
anyone. 
#17 – I’m not in the mood to be in social gatherings with friends, and prefer more to 
be on my own/isolated/hermitic. 
#18 – [I] go back into my shell and stop interacting with others. 
#19 – When I’m depressed I don’t want to talk to anyone or go anywhere. 
#23 – When I’m depressed I isolate myself and become hermitic … I am not really 
in the mood for them [other people], because I like to be alone when I’m depressed. 
#25 – I want to be alone, and have nobody around me. 
#27 – I am not even in the mood for myself and I like to be alone … I’m not in the 
mood for anyone around me … I’m not in the mood to be with others at all and only 
want to be alone. 
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#28 – [I am] hermitic, I stay away from social situations … in most cases I isolate 
myself and don’t want to go see anyone, or let any visitors to come and see me … I 
don’t take part in any social gatherings, be it a funeral or weddings, and I’m not in 
the mood for [being around] my children and am mostly just with myself and isolated. 
As mentioned earlier, in the Iranian context, the conflict between one and the Other dominates 
one’s frame of thought and one’s relationship with others. The conflict, represented in the 
endless loop of not understanding, negative attitudes and emotions, and aggression, is seen to 
be unresolvable. In other words, due to the circle of negative experiences and negative thoughts 
and attitudes, the very possibility of re-establishing the personal bond, one that is constructive 
rather than destructive, is removed from one’s space of possibilities. In this case, then, the only 
change in one’s behaviour that could result in the reduction of the conflict and the negativity 
that comes with it, is to remove oneself from social interactions, i.e. to escape from the 
interpersonal relationships and the conflict they present.  
Furthermore, given the emphasis placed on personal relationships in Iranian culture, as 
a collectivist society, the notion that escape is the only way to reduce interpersonal tensions 
becomes more plausible. The cultural importance attached to relationships can be seen in the 
fact that despite certain changes, living alone remains an unacceptable way of life for most 
Iranians. It is generally accepted that the best way of life is one that puts family at the centre, 
and this means that most people live with family members. A life separate from family is seen 
as a flawed and incomplete way of life. Ultimately, such norms mean that the only way one 
could have a personal space to oneself, is by retracting from the everyday way of life, which is 
defined by the constant presence of, and contact with other people. In such a scenario, one does 
not feel alone, as there is always an Other present and as has been seen, this presence often 
brings with it feelings of conflict. This ever-present nature of the interpersonal conflict forces 
one to try and retract oneself from the social situations.  
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It should further be noted that the cultural norms of interacting with others and being a 
certain way in their presence, could add more pressure on the depressed patients and in turn add 
to the frustration already felt in interpersonal relationships. For instance, one is expected to visit 
one’s family regularly, or be hospitable to anyone who comes to visit one, whether invited or 
not. The fact that depressed patients talk about being unable to fulfil such expectations, 
represents both an expression of inability in illness which legitimises their suffering, and a 
source of pressure that makes the case for escaping from the social interactions ever so stronger.  
#21 – I isolate myself and really don’t like to interact with anyone, or if anyone 
comes to visit me I don’t feel like being hospitable. 
#28 – I stay away from others and stay at home alone and don’t have any relation 
with others, I don’t even go to [visit] my father’s house. 
Conclusion 
I have given an account of the personal relationships and how they are affected and altered in 
depression in Iran. In addition to giving a phenomenological account such difficulties, I have 
argued that the cultural norms, expectations, and way of life, have an undeniable effect on the 
manifestation and experiences of interpersonal difficulties. As I have noted, particular cross-
cultural differences play a role in shaping the different emotional experiences of depression. 
First, greater misconceptions of depression in Iran, underlying social judgements and attitudes, 
form the backdrop of emotional experiences in depression. Second, due to the collectivist nature 
of the society in Iran, depressed patients tend to attribute the cause of their depression to external 
factors and people. This in turn exacerbates the aggression felt towards others in depression. 
Lastly, cultural norms around one’s way of life and conducting oneself in Iran, are essentially 
centred around the presence of other people and one’s duties towards them. This emphasis 
influences the way Iranians attempt to overcome the negative interpersonal emotions and 
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experiences, namely by isolating themselves and escaping from others. This differs from 
depressed patients in the UK, who often complain of loneliness in depression.  
In this account I have shown that both a phenomenological understanding and an 
appreciation of cultural norms is essential for a holistic understanding of experiences in 
depression. I have used a Sartrean account of emotions and our relations with others to 
illuminate on the experiences of the interpersonal in depression – these include the ever-present 
conflict between I and Other, which comes to the foreground in depression and defines the 
emotional reactions to the presence and actions of Others. I have shown how a consideration of 
differing cultural norms can illuminate the differences in behaviours and symptoms of 
depressive patients, as seen in Iran and the UK. I have demonstrated that cross-cultural 
comparison of the interpersonal experiences of depression, would be incomplete without 
looking at both phenomenology and culture as they inform and shape one another, and 
ultimately the individual experiences and manifestations of depression.*  
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Age: ………….     Sex: …………………..     Place of residence: …………………….. 
Have you ever been diagnosed with depression? If so, please give details of your diagnosis and 
the type of treatment you have received.  
Have you ever been diagnosed with any other mental illnesses? If so, please give details. 
Questions 
1. Describe your emotions and moods during those periods when you are depressed. In 
what ways are they different from when you are not depressed? 
2. Does the world look different when you’re depressed? If so, how? 
3. Do other people, including family and friends, seem different when you’re depressed? 
If so, how? 
4. How does your body feel when you’re depressed? 
5. How does depression affect your ability to perform routine tasks and other everyday 
activities? 
6. When you are depressed, does time seem different to you? If so, how? 
7. How, if at all, does depression affect your ability to think? 
8. In what ways, if any, does depression make you think differently about life compared 
to when you are not depressed? 
9. If you have taken medication for depression, what effect did it have? 
 27 
10. Are there aspects of depression that you find particularly difficult to convey to others? 
If so, could you try as best you can to indicate what they are and why they are so hard 
to express. 
11. What do you think depression is and what, in your view, caused your depression? 
12. Who and/or what have you consulted in order to try to understand your depression? 
(E.g., medical practitioners, friends, books, internet sources, etc.). 
13. How would you describe your relationships with others when you are depressed?  
14. Has the reaction of others influenced your experience of depression? If so, how? 
15. What distinguishes what you’re feeling as depression, from other, more general forms 
of sadness?  
16. Are there any positive aspects associated with your depression? 
17. If there are important aspects of your experience of depression not covered by this 
questionnaire please describe them here.* 
*Questions 1-12 and 17 were used by the research team at Durham University, for the 
Experiences of Depression study. The questions are available online and reproduced in 
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